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T

he recognition that better use of existing internal knowledge could enhance survival chances of organizations has
spawned substantial interest in the transferability of routinized, experiential learning to additional settings within the
organization. Previous research has established that trustworthiness of the source enhances such knowledge transfer. More
recent work, however, suggests that this may not always be the case. Yet, little systematic attention has been paid to
moderating conditions. The major purpose of this paper is to identify a moderator, causal ambiguity, which delineates the
conditions as to when and how a recipient’s perception of the trustworthiness of a source affects the effectiveness of the
transfer of organizational practices.
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Better use of existing internal knowledge is seen as
essential to the survival and prosperity of organizations.
This recognition has spawned substantial interest in the
factors that inﬂuence the transferability of experiential
learning embedded in organizational practices to new
settings (Nelson and Winter 1982, Baum and Ingram
1998, Argote 1999, Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999).
An important factor in this respect is the perceived
trustworthiness1 of the source of knowledge.
Indeed, a belief in the value of a trustworthy source is
broadly supported by studies of trust and communication
in organizations. Well-known experiments in the ﬁeld
of communication have demonstrated that a trustworthy source could substantially affect a recipient’s behavior (Hovland et al. 1949, Allen and Stiff 1989, Perry
1996). Likewise, theoretical and empirical studies in the
ﬁeld of trust show how perceptions of trustworthiness
increase voluntary deference to authority in organizations (Kramer 1999, pp. 585–586; Tyler and Degoey
1996) and enhance institutionalization of innovations in
new settings (Kostova and Roth 2002).
Yet, despite its generally beneﬁcial role, perceived
trustworthiness may also promote behaviors that weaken
the overall effectiveness of knowledge transfer efforts.
Recent studies conﬁne the role of trust in relationships to speciﬁc activities and, under certain conditions,
encourage actors to complement high levels of trust

with correspondingly high levels of distrust (e.g., Sitkin
and Roth 1993, Lewicki et al. 1998) or at least with
increased monitoring (Langfred 2004). Such cautionary notes resonate with existing ﬁndings by communication researchers who have found that a trustworthy2
source could distract the recipient from the actual contents of the message thus undermining the effectiveness
of communication (Allen and Stiff 1989). In addition,
observation by trust researchers has found that trustworthiness could inhibit monitoring by the recipient,
thereby decreasing attentiveness and reducing the variety
of thought and action (Webb 1996, p. 292).
However, little systematic attention has been paid
to the conditions that determine when and how perceived trustworthiness will be related to the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. Evolutionary economics
(Nelson and Winter 1982) and the knowledge-based
view of the ﬁrm (Zander and Kogut 1995) posit that
attributes of the knowledge being transferred are primary determinants of the effectiveness of knowledge
transfer. As such, they may also moderate when and
how trustworthiness affects the effectiveness of knowledge transfer. This paper explores the moderating effect
of one speciﬁc knowledge attribute, causal ambiguity,
on the relationship between trustworthiness and the
effectiveness of intraﬁrm transfers of organizational
practices.
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Conceptual Background
Replication of Routines and the Advice
of the Source
Knowledge transfer is often undertaken to reproduce
superior results observed elsewhere within the
organization.3 Following Nelson and Winter (1982), we
use the term “template” or “template site” to refer to the
original site where exemplar results are being obtained.
An important contribution of evolutionary economics to
the understanding of knowledge transfer is to highlight
the fact that the template could be causally ambiguous
because routines may not be comprehended fully by
any of the individuals involved.
There are three possible ways for a recipient4 to
approach the reproduction of superior results under such
circumstances. At a minimum, knowledge of superior
results can be used merely to set or adjust expectations
for future performance. In addition, a recipient can study
the actual practices that underlie those results. However,
both of these approaches are likely to involve redundant and possibly costly rediscovery of information that
already exists. As a result, when feasible, the recipient
can plausibly be expected to ﬁrst seek the advice of the
source when undertaking a transfer.5
Causal Ambiguity and the Validity of the
Advice of the Source
The advice of the source is a symbolic expression of
the essential drivers of the template’s performance, their
value, and their context dependence. These aspects of
the template are referred to collectively as the template’s
“Arrow core” (Winter and Szulanski 2001). The advice
of the source, when valid, can enhance the effectiveness of the transfer by reducing or eliminating the need
for costly efforts to rediscover information that exists
already, i.e., to rediscover the Arrow core.
The validity of the contribution of the source, however, is limited by the degree of irreducible uncertainty
about the functioning of the template, i.e., by the degree
of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt 1982). The
existence of causal ambiguity means that the factors
explaining the template’s performance cannot be precisely determined (not even ex-post), and that it is therefore impossible to produce an unambiguous conception
of how the template works, i.e., to produce a unique
list of its key components and of how they interact (see
also King and Zeithaml 2001). Some features of causally
ambiguous templates are tacit, and thus unlikely to be
codiﬁed. Others may be quite apparent but may contribute to results in nonobvious ways.
Thus, even though the source is able to achieve superior results, causal ambiguity might limit the depth of
understanding of the source, because under such circumstances there is often a gap between formal description
or nominal standards—e.g., as represented in training programs and manuals—and actual routine work
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practices as performed by the organization’s members
(Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 41; Nelson and Winter
1982, p. 108). Such gaps stem from partial articulation
of the espoused rules that govern behavior (Argyris and
Schon 1978). Partial articulation results from the partly
tacit nature of individual skills (Polanyi 1962), from the
partly tacit coordination principles that govern collective
action (Kogut and Zander 1992, Winter 1987), from partial knowledge of the production process (Bohn 1994),
from the opacity of the organization (Williamson 1975),
and from the need for compromise to avoid continuous
conﬂicts (Nelson and Winter 1982). Increasing levels of
causal ambiguity are likely to be associated with a wider
gap between the espoused description and the actual
functioning of the template, thus effectively placing an
upper bound on the depth of the source’s understanding
of its functioning.
The General Effect of Trustworthiness on
Knowledge Transfer
If the source has complete knowledge on how to obtain
superior results (i.e., can fully articulate the true Arrow
core), then the problem of transfer becomes the problem of accurately communicating the Arrow core. The
underlying logic for this statement reﬂects that of the
mathematical theory of communication (Attewell 1992,
Shannon and Weaver 1949). This theory treats communication as an act of signaling where a source transmits
a fully codiﬁed message that is absorbed and then acted
on by a recipient. The communication act is designed
by the source to inﬂuence the behavior of the recipient
in a speciﬁc way. Accordingly, the transfer is seen to
be effective to the extent that it changes the behavior of
the recipient in productive ways (Shannon and Weaver
1949). A trusting recipient is more likely to accept the
advice of the source and change its behavior, and trust
is more likely to occur when the source is perceived as
trustworthy (Andrews and Delahaye 2000, Mayer et al.
1995).
Thus, the perceived trustworthiness of the source
will signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the likelihood of behavioral change by the recipient. Trust scholars argue
that trust increases the amount of information that can
be exchanged (Carley 1991, Tsai and Ghoshal 1998),
decreases the cost of exchange (Curall and Judge 1995,
Zaheer et al. 1998), and increases cooperation with the
source of the knowledge (Dirks and Ferrin 2001, Kramer
1999, Tyler and Degoey 1996). Communication scholars (Hovland et al. 1949) argue that when the recipient
perceives the source as credible or trustworthy, it will be
less suspicious and thus more open and receptive to the
message. In sum, a trusting recipient is more likely to
comply with the prescriptions of the Arrow core, which
is, by assumption, optimal and unambiguous. Increased
compliance will be reﬂected in a more complete and
accurate copy of the practices found in the template.
This leads to the ﬁrst hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1. The perception of a source’s trustworthiness will be positively related to the accuracy of the
reproduction of the template.
The Moderating Effect of Causal Ambiguity
When the functioning of the template cannot be completely observed, i.e., it is causally ambiguous, multiple conﬂicting versions of the Arrow core may coexist.
That is because available evidence is not sufﬁcient to
select one and rule out the others. Each one of these
different perceptions of the Arrow core is likely to be
either a distorted and/or simpliﬁed version of the “true”
one. Distortion may reﬂect the persistence of rationalized institutional myths (Meyer and Rowan 1977); fragmentary, myopic, and disparate understandings of how
the work is accomplished (Carroll 1998); superstitious
learning (Levitt and March 1988); and/or faulty memory (Golden 1992). Moreover, as Miller (1993) argues,
processes of successful organizations tend, over time, to
come to focus more narrowly on a single theme, activity, or issue at the expense of all others, thus becoming
more pure or “simple” over time. Therefore, despite best
efforts to the contrary, a trustworthy source may still end
up supplying a somewhat distorted or simpliﬁed account
of the true Arrow core of a causally ambiguous template,
possibly leaving out crucial details.
When the source cannot have complete knowledge of
how to obtain superior results (i.e., does not know and
cannot fully articulate the true Arrow core), then the
problem of transfer becomes a problem of replication
(i.e., an iterative process consisting of a set of attempts
to reproduce the results using as a referent the information available at the template site to correct implementation deﬁciencies) (Winter and Szulanski 2001).
March et al. (1991) argue that a prerequisite for social
action is the existence of reliable, i.e., stable and shared,
conceptions of work practices. Given that organizations
tend to converge on increasingly simplistic conceptions
of the Arrow core (Miller 1993) and given the difﬁculty of changing prevailing shared conceptions (March
et al. 1991, Nelson and Winter 1982), it is reasonable to
expect that when consulted a source will likely provide
a hypothetical Arrow core that reﬂects prevailing shared
understandings and beliefs. As argued earlier, the higher
the level of causal ambiguity, the greater the potential
gap between prevailing shared beliefs and the actual
work practices, thus limiting the value of the source’s
advice. Under these circumstances, knowledge of the
source’s Arrow core may not be sufﬁcient to attain
desired results.
For this reason, the recipient will need to supplement, at some point during the transfer, the advice of the
source with inferences drawn from direct observation of
the template. Because such action may require substantial additional effort, the lower the initial level of success
experienced when acting solely based on the advice of
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the source, the sooner the effort to learn through direct
observation begins. Because the value of the advice from
the source decreases with causal ambiguity, the higher
the level of causal ambiguity, the earlier the recipient
could be expected to begin direct observation.
As the recipient begins to observe the template practices directly, these practices (rather than the source’s
advice) will become the point of reference for problem solving in further iterations. In such situations, as
Winter and Szulanski (2001) argue, it is desirable to
reproduce the template’s practices as accurately as possible to maximize the value of the template site as a
referent for problem solving. Otherwise, they explain,
“modiﬁcations introduced to adapt the established template may create new problems; problems that will have
to be solved in-situ through a costly process of trial and
error, since they cannot be solved through reference to
the established template” (p. 737). Thus, accurate reproduction of the speciﬁc details of the original template
shortens the time and effort required to pinpoint and correct differences that may exist between the replica and
the original. Intel’s “copy exactly” philosophy for building semiconductor plants provides a tangible example
of the practical meaning of such logic (Iansiti 1998), as
do Rank Xerox’s policy of forcing country subsidiaries
to follow best practice “down to the last detail” until
they achieve similar performance (Financial Times 1997)
and Great Harvest’s learning covenant that holds new
franchisees to the “tiniest letter” of their promises to
follow the original system (Great Harvest Bread Co.
1999). Thus, in an effective iteration process, the recipient’s practices could be plausibly expected to accurately
resemble those of the template’s site.
However, the recipient will cling to the source’s
advice longer, i.e., may postpone efforts to learn from
direct observation, the more trustworthy the source of
advice is perceived to be. Even though the extent of
irreducible uncertainty may increase the vigilance of the
recipient and motivate it to supplement the advice of
the source with direct observation, trustworthiness may
act in the opposite direction by inhibiting the felt need
for such action (Lewicki et al. 1998), distracting the
recipient from the relevant details, reducing the level
of attention to detail, operating as a simplifying heuristic in the interpretation of information, which ultimately
effectively limits cognitive effort to obtaining a general impression of the source’s advice (Allen and Stiff
1989, Perry 1996, Uzzi 1997). Trustworthiness also lowers the incentive of the recipient to reduce uncertainty
by monitoring6 (Barber 1983, Langfred 2004, Lewis and
Weigert 1985, McAllister 1995, Webb 1996), encourages
actors to suspend judgment of others (McEvily et al.
2003), and inhibits a critical attitude and critical thinking that is necessary to recognize the limitations of the
source’s advice (Petty and Cacioppo 1996). Trust scholars argue that the level of comfort with a limited cognitive effort and a less critical attitude is inversely related
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to the concern that damage may result from the interaction with the source (Noteboom 1997).
In sum, trustworthiness could effectively stiﬂe direct
observation, thus prolonging the period of time during which the recipient acts solely on the basis of the
source’s ﬂawed and incomplete Arrow core.7 Because
once the transfer begins there is a ﬁnite window of
opportunity during which changes are feasible (Tyre and
Orlikowski 1994), the longer the delay in initiating direct
observation, the lower the likelihood that direct observation (if it at all occurs) will have substantial impact
on the recipient’s actions. Hence, one would expect that
the relationship between perceived trustworthiness and
accuracy will substantially change with increasing levels
of causal ambiguity.
Hypothesis 2. As causal ambiguity increases, the
positive relationship between the perception of a
source’s trustworthiness and the level of accuracy of
the reproduction of the template will ﬁrst weaken and
then, under conditions of high causal ambiguity, turn
negative.

Method
Sample and Procedures
The transfer of best practices (O’Dell et al. 1998) provides a propitious setting to observe intraﬁrm knowledge transfer. Data were collected through a two-step
questionnaire survey. The ﬁrst step of the survey asked
companies to provide a list of transfers for study that
included sufﬁcient detail about the parties involved in
those transfers (i.e., respondents). To provide practices
for study, companies were directed to search for transfers of practices that could not be performed by a single individual, but rather required the involvement of a
group. More than 60 companies, with varying degrees of
experience in the transfer of practices, expressed interest. Of that group, 12 were able to provide such a list,
with 8 providing entries of sufﬁcient quality to warrant
continuation of their involvement in the research. The
eight companies were: AMP, AT&T Paradyne, British
Petroleum, Burmah Castrol, Chevron Corporation, EDS,
Kaiser Permanente, and Rank Xerox. Detailed speciﬁcation regarding the identiﬁcation and the selection of the
companies is included in Appendix 1.
The second step of the survey was devised to analyze speciﬁc transfers. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 271
returned questionnaires, spanning 122 transfers of 38
practices,8 for a response rate of 61%.9 The transfer is
the unit of analysis. To triangulate and obtain the most
objective measures possible, separate but identical questionnaires were sent to an individual within a source, a
recipient, and a third-party unit for each transfer. Sources
and recipients were subunits of an organization. Third
parties were deﬁned as a party knowledgeable with the
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transfer but not a part of the source or the recipient
unit; i.e., a corporate ofﬁce, an outside consultant, etc.
The respondents in each case are individuals representing their organizational unit.
Triangulation using all three respondent types was
considered appropriate. It is difﬁcult to assess the perceptions of “units” because the perceptions of individual respondents within a particular unit are likely to
be only somewhat representative of their unit’s overall
perception. Moreover, the perceptions of various units
are likely to signiﬁcantly overlap because perceptions
are often developed from depersonalized presumptive
rationales based on lessons from prior history, afﬁliation
with speciﬁc social categories, formal roles, and organizational rules regarding transaction norms (Kramer
1999). Given sampling restrictions and to obtain the
most complete and unbiased data possible, we considered it more appropriate to triangulate by obtaining
responses from three different perspectives rather than
several from a single perspective. Empirical veriﬁcation
for this approach is found in an intraclass correlation
analysis that indicates high inter-rater reliability (from
0.47 to 0.60 for the main variables) between the three
perspectives and suggests that observations should consist of the average of the three perspectives for each
transfer (average of raters coefﬁcient ranges from 0.73
to 0.82 for the main variables).
The respondents included 110 sources units, 101 recipient units, and 60 third parties. Average item nonresponse
was lower than 5%. An average of 2.2 questionnaires
were received for each transfer.
Construction of Measures
Multiple-item scales were developed for all constructs
to ensure the reliability and validity of the measurement system. Little empirical precedent was available to
guide the development of the measures (see Zander and
Kogut 1995 for an exception). A broad and thorough
literature review informed the generation of the initial
constructs and the a priori assignment of items to measure those constructs. In-depth clinical work, consultation with subject experts and feedback obtained when
piloting the questionnaire helped reﬁne the choice of
constructs, identify the most relevant items for those
constructs, and select their proper wording given the
empirical context. Some items were discarded, but not
re-assigned, after the full data set was obtained; the a
priori assignment of items was preserved for all constructs, except accuracy, which we introduced ex-post.
Unless otherwise stated, a balanced ﬁve-point, Likerttype scale was used to measure most items in the questionnaire: Y! = “Yes!”; y = “yes, but”; o = “no opinion”;
n = “no, not really”; N! = “No!” Following Nunnally’s
(1978) recommendation, construct scores were computed by adding up the standardized item scores.
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Below we detail the operationalization of the central
constructs for this paper. All other constructs are detailed
in Appendix 2. Those that are reverse scored are indicated with an (RS).
Causal Ambiguity. The construction of the measure
of causal ambiguity was primarily based on the theory
of uncertain imitability (Lippman et al. 1982). Five of
the eight items in the measure of causal ambiguity are
derived from Lippman and Rumelt (1982). The full text
of those questionnaire items is: “The limits of the [practice] are fully speciﬁed (RS)”; “With the [practice], we
know why a given action results in a given outcome
(RS)”; “When a problem surfaced with the [practice],
the precise reasons for failure could not be articulated
even after the event”; “There is a precise list of the skills,
resources, and prerequisites necessary for successfully
performing the [practice] (RS)”; and “It is well known
how the components of that list interact to produce the
[practice’s] output (RS).”
The remaining three items are designed to infer causal
ambiguity from the degree of tacitness of the practice
(Winter 1987, Zander and Kogut 1995). The full text of
these items is: “Operating procedures for the [practice]
are available (RS)”; “Useful manuals for the [practice]
are available (RS)”; “Existing work manuals and operating procedures precisely describe what people working
in the [practice] actually do (RS).”
Trustworthiness. This scale was designed to assess
the perceived trustworthiness of an organizational unit.
The choice of speciﬁc items was primarily inﬂuenced by
Walton’s (1975) study of the determinants of perceived
trustworthiness of organizational subunits and overlap
with the Mayer et al. (1995) conception of trustworthiness. To bridge levels of analysis we relied on Nelson
and Winter’s (1982, p. 98) notion of agent or organizational member, which while typically referring to an
individual, applies to any organizational unit that can
“accomplish something on its own.”
Mayer et al. (1995) propose three attributes of trustworthiness: benevolence, integrity, and ability. In the
context of unit-level knowledge transfer, however,
ability10 is the attribute of greatest consequence. The
ability of the source to both achieve results and actually
transfer the practice is at the heart of both the efﬁcacy of
the transfer and also of perceptions of source unit trustworthiness. While benevolence is not without inﬂuence
at this level of analysis, it likely plays a different role
than at the individual level. In individual-level analyses
of trustworthiness, benevolence is usually interpreted as
the intention to do no harm. In the context of unit-level
transfer, one would not expect a source unit to put forth
the costly effort necessary to harm a recipient through
transferring false practices. A lack of benevolence at
this level of analysis is most likely to result in a lack
of motivation, and hence effort, to aid the recipient in
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the transfer effort. Benevolence, then, at the unit level
of analysis and in the context of knowledge transfer,
is substantively equal to the source’s motivation in the
transfer.
Because ability is the central trustworthiness construct
of interest and the one most likely to interact with causal
ambiguity (what does it mean for the intentions of a
source to be causally ambiguous?), we have chosen to
focus on ability as the primary measure of trustworthiness. However, because benevolence, in terms of source
motivation, is also likely to inﬂuence the general efﬁcacy
of the transfer, we include a measure of source motivation as a control variable.
Focusing on trustworthiness in terms of source ability,
we derived four items from the sources mentioned
above. We asked whether superior results of the source
were visible and remained stable, whether the source
possessed the necessary resources to support the transfer,
and whether the source was able to accommodate the
needs of the recipient into the practice.
Accuracy. The effectiveness of the transfer is operationalized by how accurately the recipient reproduces a
replica of the template. Accuracy has remained a relevant and central construct for those branches of the
communication ﬁeld that focus primarily on directional
exchange, as is the case when routines or best practices
are transferred within organizations. Not all transfers
of knowledge, however, are intended to be accurate. A
measure of accuracy must be sensitive to differences
between the features of the replica and those of the original template (Muchinsky 1977, Roberts and O’Reilly
1974, Shannon and Weaver 1949), both to intended and
unintended modiﬁcations introduced to the original template (Eisenberg and Phillips 1991, Stohl and Redding
1987). Communication scholars suggest two types of
modiﬁcations. Modiﬁcations can be general, i.e., affecting the comprehensive meaning of the practice. Alternatively, speciﬁc aspects of the practice can be altered
while preserving its overall meaning.11
The measure of accuracy has eight items. We used
six items to assess the level of general modiﬁcations.
We ﬁrst asked whether compared to the source’s practice, the recipient’s one is: 1 = “Exactly the same”;
2 = “Essentially the same”; 3 = “Slightly modiﬁed”;
4 = “Markedly modiﬁed”; 5 = “Completely different”
(RS). Then we asked whether modiﬁcations were introduced to make the practice workable (RS) and to
adapt the practice to different environments (RS). We
asked whether unnecessary modiﬁcations were performed (RS), whether the practice was modiﬁed in ways
contrary to expert’s advice (RS), and/or whether in altering the practice further problems were created (RS).
Then, we tried to assess speciﬁc modiﬁcations. We
evaluated the incompleteness of the replication by asking whether: 1 = “All modules have been transferred”;
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2 = “Only selected, but all the essential modules have
been transferred”; 3 = “Only the essential modules have
been transferred”; 4 = “Only selected modules, some
essential some not, have been transferred”; 5 = “None of
the modules have been transferred” (RS). Next, we asked
whether original modules of the practice were replaced
by existing ones at the recipient’s side (RS).
Control Variables. To complete the speciﬁcation of
the model, additional measures are introduced to control for unobserved heterogeneity. These factors include
the remaining elements of Shannon and Weaver’s (1949)
model of communication, i.e., the source’s and recipient’s motivations, the recipient’s absorptive and retentive
ability, the proveness of the knowledge transferred, and
the elements of the social context (i.e., the ease of the
relationship and the fertility of the context). Detailed
speciﬁcation of these items and their expected relationship with accuracy is included in Appendix 2. Second,
we added dummy variables to control for the possibility
that results are due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc effects. Finally, we
include Kogut and Singh’s (1988) measure of cultural
distance to control for the appropriateness of the transfer. In some cases modiﬁcations to the template may
be introduced in response to differences in the recipient’s environment, rendering an accurate reproduction
less appropriate. It has been argued that such adaptations
will be more likely to occur when the distance between
the source and recipient environments is greater, making
cultural distance an adequate measure of appropriateness
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989, Prahalad and Doz 1987).
Table 1

Performance of Measures

Construct
∗

(1) Source’s motivation
(2) Trustworthiness
(3) Context

(4) Causal ambiguity
(5) Knowledge proveness
(6) Recipient’s motivation∗
(7) Recipient’s absorptive
capacity
(8) Recipient’s retentive
capacity
(9) Relationship
(10) Accuracy
∗

Performance of the Measures
Table 1 summarizes the performance of the measures,
including the dependent variables, the predictors, and the
control variables.
Convergent validity (reliability and unidimensionality)
was evaluated separately for each construct (Gerbing and
Anderson 1988). Cronbach’s alpha was used as a measure of reliability because it provides a lower bound to
the reliability of a scale and is the most widely used
measure (Nunnally 1978). All but one scale had an alpha
greater than 0.70, thus providing an adequate level of
reliability for predictor tests and hypothesized measures
of a construct (Nunnally 1978, pp. 245–246). The least
reliable scale scored only marginally below that standard
(0.68). Unidimensionality was assessed through factor
analysis and computation of the theta coefﬁcient (Armor
1974, Carmines and Zeller 1979, Zeller and Carmines
1980). The unidimensionality of all 10 scales was adequate. Multicollinearity was checked via tolerance values with a range from 0.395 to 0.873 and an average
of 0.698. Finally, all variables meet reasonable assumptions of normality (see Table 1 for skewness and kurtosis
values).
Discriminant validity was evaluated for all construct
pairs by examining the observed correlation matrix of
the constructs. If the correlation between constructs i
and j is 1 (i.e., if constructs i and j are perfectly corre05
lated), the observed correlation should be 05
i  ∗ j 
where i and j are the reliability coefﬁcients for
the constructs. In practical terms, testing for discriminant validity entails computing the upper limit for the

Description

Cronbach 

Items

Valid N

Avg. inter
item corr.

Skewness

Kurtosis

Motivation of the source unit to
support the transfer
Degree to which the source of the
best practice is perceived as
trustworthy in terms of ability
Degree to which the organizational
context supports the development
of transfers
Depth of knowledge
Degree of conjecture on the utility of
the transferred knowledge
Motivation of the recipient unit to
support the transfer
Ability of the recipient unit to identify,
value, and apply new knowledge
Ability of the recipient unit to support
and routinize the use of new
knowledge
Ease of communication and intimacy
of the relationship
Degree of similarity between the
replica and the template

0.93

13

140

0.5

−014

−068

0.73

4

136

0.42

−058

−011

0.79

14

140

0.23

−004

065

0.90
0.68

8
3

133
138

0.54
0.42

039
−057

−035
014

0.93

14

140

0.48

−031

−076

0.81

9

140

0.33

−035

019

0.82

6

140

0.44

−035

014

0.70

3

133

0.44

037

083

0.79

8

127

0.33

−022

−055

These scales are composed of binary items. Both scales qualify marginally as Guttman scales.
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Table 2

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
∗

Correlations Between the Independent Variables, the Dependent Variables, and the Control Variables (Casewise)

Cultural distance
Source’s motivation
Trustworthiness
Interaction causal
ambiguity/trustworthiness
Context
Causal ambiguity
Unproven knowledge
Recipient’s motivation
Recipient’s absorptive
capacity
Recipient’s retentive
capacity
Relationship
Accuracy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

100
−033∗
−013
011

100
043∗
−002

100
031∗

−003
016
−023∗
−029∗
−003

017
−039∗
032∗
067∗
004

015
−053∗
038∗
026∗
025∗

−015
−026∗
003
011
004

100
−036∗
031∗
019∗
037∗

100
−051∗
−037∗
−023∗

100
020∗
021∗

011

−021∗

004

−003

041∗

−020∗

011

−005
−016

018
043∗

016∗
040∗

−012
−004

028∗
030∗

−037∗
−050∗

040∗
030∗

8

9

10

11

12

100
032∗

100

100

100
024∗
−002
020∗
024∗

100
061∗
014
015

100
014
−001

Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. All correlation coefﬁcients are different than 1 at the 0.0012 level.

conﬁdence interval of the observed correlations and
testing whether this limit is smaller than the maximum
possible correlation between the scales as computed with
their reliability coefﬁcients. Table 2 reports the correlations for all the variables. All construct pairs met the
discriminant validity test at p < 00012, lessening concerns over common method bias.
Assumptions for the Analysis
Predictors Are Invariant Throughout the Transfer. As
a ﬁrst approximation, predictors are assumed to remain
invariant for the duration of the transfer. When such
an assumption holds true, the timing of the measurement of the independent variables is not critical. This
assumption is deemed reasonable because most of the
predictors typically change slowly. However there may
be exceptions. Some predictors such as the motivation of
the source, the motivation of the recipient and the nature
of the relationship between the units may be affected
by the expected outcome of the transfer. Preexisting
relationships between source and recipient subunits did
exist for at least two years prior to the beginning of the
transfer.
Cross-Sectional Comparison of Transfers Is Warranted. Leonard-Barton (1990) argues that it is necessary to measure multi-item constructs at a “deﬁned
point” in time if meaningful comparisons are wanted,
because the meaning of complex constructs depends on
when they are measured during a transfer. As point of
reference for her study, she selected the “very ﬁrst use
of the technology in a routine production task” as the
anchor point. She chose that point because it could be
identiﬁed with a “satisfactory degree of precision.” In
this study, all questionnaires were completed within a
narrow12 band of 3.5 months, which started 5 months
after the ﬁrst day that knowledge was ﬁrst put to use
by the recipient. Thus, all transfers are at a deﬁned and

comparable point in time. Comparison across transfers
is thus considered appropriate.
Analysis
We used hierarchical regression to test the hypotheses.
Model 1 included only seven control variables pertaining to the main characteristics of the transfer plus cultural distance. Model 2 adds trustworthiness. Model 3
adds causal ambiguity and the interaction term. Finally,
Model 4 adds the ﬁrm dummy variables. We report partial F tests to signiﬁcance of the added variables.

Results

The results for the regression analysis are reported in
Table 3.
Model 1 is strongly signiﬁcant (F = 7466; p < 0001)
with an adjusted R-square of 0.308. In Model 2, the signiﬁcance of the trustworthiness variable is shown both
by its t-statistic and by the signiﬁcance of the partial
F test. As well, the adjusted R-square increases to 0.344.
The signiﬁcance of the moderator is shown in Model 3
(F = 110070; p < 00000) with the interaction term
being signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. With the introduction
of the interaction term, the adjusted R-square jumps to
0.504. That the addition of the moderator is signiﬁcant
is conﬁrmed by the results of the partial F tests, which
are signiﬁcant at the 0.001 level. The addition of ﬁrm
dummies in Model 4 detracts signiﬁcantly from Model 3
as both the F -statistic and the adjusted R-square drop.
The control variables, when signiﬁcant, are relatively
stable and have the expected sign. A supportive context
could be expected to contribute to accuracy. The source’s
motivation contributes to accuracy because it reﬂects
the desire of the source to exchange knowledge, thus
increasing the effective amount of opinion and explanatory information transferred to the recipient (Berger and
Kellerman 1983). A recipient’s absorptive capacity aids
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Table 3

Regressions of Transfer Effectiveness (Accuracy)
Model 1

Model 2

Trustworthiness

0231

∗∗

Model 3

2512

Causal ambiguity
Interaction of causal ambiguity
and trustworthiness
Source’s motivation
Context
Knowledge proveness
Recipient’s motivation
Recipient’s absorptive capacity
Recipient’s retentive capacity
Relationship
Cultural distance

0497∗∗∗
0254∗∗
−0028
−0198∧
0174∧
−0018
0150∧
−0041

4165
2768
−0302
−1713
1677
−0171
1706
−0501

0435∗∗∗ 3573
0251∗∗ 2512
−0114 −1177
−0172 −1555
0116
1139
0031
0295
0161∧
1852
−0042 −0512

0213

∗

2367

Valid N

0217∗

2205

−0436∗∗∗ −4371
−0208∗∗ −2550

−0269∗∗ −2509
−0173∗ −1976

0315∗∗ 2885
0152∧
1863
−0165∧ −1895
−0183∧ −1806
0206∗
2267
−0229∗ −2457
0120
1514
0002
0031

0240∗
0162∧
−0133
−0146
0135
−0184∧
0140
−0185

Firm dummies
R-square
Adj. R-square
F
Partial-F

Model 4

2059
1772
−1414
−1416
1392
−1807
1624
−1470

Not signiﬁcant
0.356
0.308
7.466

0.396
0.344
7.637
Model 1 vs. 2
5.330∗
115

117

Notes. t-values in parentheses.
∗
Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level; ∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level;

∗∗∗

0.554
0.504
11.070
Model 2 vs. 3
6.994∗∗∗
110

0.557
0.479
7.103
Model 3 vs. 4
3.135∗∗
110

Signiﬁcant at 0.001 level; ∧ Signiﬁcant at 0.1 level.

the recipient in implementing new knowledge, while its
retentive capacity hinders that implementation by creating barriers to unlearning old knowledge.
The coefﬁcients of causal ambiguity and trustworthiness (Models 2–4) are highly signiﬁcant and stable.
Causal ambiguity ( 1 in Equation (1.1)) is negatively
related to accuracy (in Model 3: −0436; p < 0001)
and trustworthiness ( 2 in Equation (1.1)) is positively
related to accuracy (in Model 3: 0.213; p < 005). The
interaction effect ( 1×2 in Equation (1.1)) is negative
and signiﬁcant (in Model 3: −0208; p < 001), suggesting that the connection between trustworthiness and
accuracy weakens as the moderator, causal ambiguity,
increases.
To assess the net effect of perceptions of trustworthiness on accuracy, both the main effect and the interaction need to be considered. To complete the analysis
of the total effect, we analyze its sign and magnitude,
conditional on the level of the causal ambiguity, following procedures recommended by Aiken and West
(1991). Table 4 reports the coefﬁcients and p-values of
trustworthiness,13 with causal ambiguity set to different
values (using estimates from Model 3). When causal
ambiguity is low (−3 s.d.), a one standard deviation
increase in perceived trustworthiness increases accuracy
by 0.83 standard deviations. The effect is highly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, supporting Hypothesis 2, as causal ambiguity increases, the
total effect of trustworthiness on accuracy progressively
weakens and then becomes negative and signiﬁcant
at two standard deviations above the mean, becoming
highly signiﬁcant at three standard deviations above the
mean.

Robustness of the Results
Further analyses were conducted to explore the stability
of the coefﬁcients. Missing data were handled in three
different ways. First, regressions were run with missing
data deleted casewise, then with missing data deleted
pairwise, and ﬁnally by substituting the missing value
of the constructs with the mean value of the construct.
Results remained stable.
To further test the robustness of the results and possible sensitivity to differences in the three perspectives
sampled (source, recipient, and third party), we conducted an analysis where each perspective was treated
as an individual observation, with potential differences
Table 4

Total Effect of the Perceived Trustworthiness on
Accuracy
Total effect

Causal ambiguity set to:
Three standard deviations below the mean
Two standard deviations below the mean
One standard deviation below the mean
The mean
One standard deviation above the mean
Two standard deviations above the mean
Three standard deviations above the mean

Trustworthiness tot

(t-value)

0837∗∗∗ 8920
0629∗∗∗ 6782
0421∗∗∗ 4651
0213∗∗ 2545
0005
0482
−0203∧ −1525
−0411∗∗∗ −3463

Notes. Values calculated using estimates of Model 3. ∗∗ Signiﬁcant
at 0.01 level; ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 0.001 level; ∧ Signiﬁcant at 0.1 level.
The total effect of trustworthiness on accuracy is derived
from the following equations that are based on the regression
equation deﬁned as Accuracy = 0 + 1 Causal Ambiguity +
2 Trustworthiness + 1×2 Causal Ambiguity × Trustworthiness + · · · +
cn Control Variablen : [1.1]
Trustworthiness tot = 2 + 1×2 Causal Ambiguity; [1.2] Accuracy = Trustworthiness tot ∗ Trustworthiness.
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controlled through the use of perspective dummy variables. Finally, we conducted an additional analysis
where, rather than pool the perspectives or utilize each as
an individual response for each transfer, we utilized only
the best questionnaire in terms of completeness and level
of detail in responses. The models remain highly significant with adj. R-square ≥ 0420 and all coefﬁcients of
the predictors remaining stable.
Finally, because some respondents were involved in
more than one transfer, we conducted analyses to verify
that a lack of independence between some observations
did not signiﬁcantly alter the results. First, we ran a
series of regressions with all nonindependent observations removed. Second, we ran the analysis with one
observation, chosen at random, from each nonindependent group included in the analysis and the remaining
removed. In both cases the results remained stable and
signiﬁcant.
While the results remain stable to robustness checks,
it is possible that the results are an artifact of reverse
causality. While we predict that causal ambiguity acts
as a moderator between perceptions of trustworthiness
and accuracy, the perceptions of trustworthiness may
also act as a mediator between causal ambiguity and
accuracy. The presence of high causal ambiguity may
lower perceptions of trustworthiness, with lower levels
of the perception of trustworthiness directly contributing to lower levels of accuracy. This conception is in
line with traditional theories of trust that predict that
lower trust results in lower levels of social exchange
(Carley 1991, Curall and Judge 1995, Tsai and Ghoshal
1998). To test this possibility, we conducted a mediation
analysis. In Step 1 of the analysis the beta for causal
ambiguity (with all control variables included) regressed
on trustworthiness was −0397, signiﬁcant at the 0.001
level. For Step 2, the beta for causal ambiguity regressed
on accuracy (with trustworthiness left out but all control
variables included) was −0384, signiﬁcant at the 0.001
level. Finally, the beta for causal ambiguity regressed
on accuracy with trustworthiness (and control variables)
included in the model was −0326, signiﬁcant at the 0.01
level. Thus, we ﬁnd evidence of a small mediating effect
but by no means a full mediating effect for perceptions
of trustworthiness. As such, we can conclude that causal
ambiguity has a signiﬁcant moderating effect of its own.
This removes some of the concern that the ﬁndings are
due to an artifact rather than a real relationship.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our main ﬁnding is that the extent to which, on balance,
the perceived trustworthiness of the source contributes
to the effectiveness of intraﬁrm knowledge transfer
depends on the nature of the knowledge transferred.
Speciﬁcally, the accuracy of such transfers is moderated
by the causal ambiguity of the knowledge. We focus
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on situations in which the transfer is primarily an effort
to replicate, in another location, results that have been
obtained through effective but nonetheless imperfectly
understood practices.
This intricate effect of trustworthiness reﬂects the fact
that trustworthiness promotes both functional and dysfunctional processes, fostering receptivity on the one
hand and lessening the perceived need for vigilance
on the other. When causal ambiguity is high, trustworthiness may prove counterproductive. Causal ambiguity
drives a wedge between the perception and the reality
of organizational practices, making additional validation
essential. However, the degree of trustworthiness of the
source may delay or inhibit efforts to validate and supplement the source’s advice before the window of opportunity to implement change closes (Tyre and Orlikowski
1994). We show that as causal ambiguity increases, the
effect of the perceived trustworthiness of the source on
the accuracy of the transfer weakens progressively and
then becomes negative.
It is important that the ﬁndings be interpreted with
caution. First, the ﬁndings apply primarily to transfers of
knowledge within ﬁrms. While it is possible that some of
the same dynamics may exist in transfers between ﬁrms,
the presumptive rationales for deriving perceptions of
trustworthiness are likely to operate differently in an
interﬁrm setting than within a ﬁrm, and the perceptions
of trustworthiness are likely to be inﬂuenced by different
processes of simpliﬁcation and distortion. Furthermore,
the study applies speciﬁcally to the context of transfers
of organizational practices. Further research needs to
study similar constructs in additional contexts to determine the extent of the phenomenon. Beyond questions
of external validity, it should be noted that the correlational nature of this study precludes us from making
strong assertions of causality. Finally, it should be noted
that our measure of trustworthiness only includes the
factor of ability and not benevolence and integrity. While
this, along with controlling for source motivation, seems
appropriate for studies of unit-level knowledge transfer,
future research may want to explicitly include all three
factors.
Despite the above limitations, the research contributes
to the literature in a number of ways. It contributes to the
literature of trust by examining perceptions of trustworthiness within a speciﬁc context: the transfer of practices
within organizations. Rousseau et al. (1998) argue that
context is critical to understanding trust, because trust
may assume different, “multiplex” forms in different
contexts. The moderating effect of causal ambiguity on
the relationship between perceived trustworthiness and
the accuracy of knowledge transfer could be interpreted
as a change in the nature of trust that is contingent on
the characteristics of the knowledge transferred. Indeed,
the idea of multiplex forms of trust can be made more
speciﬁc by noting that above a certain level of causal
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ambiguity (just over 1 s.d) the effect of trustworthiness
could become negative. Thus, given high enough levels
of causal ambiguity, trustworthiness could actually have
a negative overall effect on the accuracy of knowledge
transfer.
It is worthwhile to return to our theorizing to speculate on why that may be the case as the overall
effect becomes negative and signiﬁcant. Indeed, when
causal ambiguity results in a simpliﬁed conception of
the Arrow core, one would expect a progressive weakening of the relationship between perceived trustworthiness
and accuracy with increasing levels of causal ambiguity.
Postponing direct observation under these conditions
results in a somewhat simpliﬁed replica, thus dampening
the link between trustworthiness and accuracy. However,
postponing direct observation when the conception of
the Arrow core offered by the source is not merely simpliﬁed, but actually distorted may result not in a partial,
but rather in an inaccurate copy of the template. This
provides a plausible explanation for a negative relationship between perceived trustworthiness and accuracy.
These implications could be generalized by noting
that in the knowledge-transfer domain, trustworthiness
is closely linked with trust, and causal ambiguity stands
for a fundamental attribute of organizational practices.
Thus, we can derive the broader implication that the
effect of trust in organizational learning is moderated by
the characteristics of the knowledge transferred.
This broader implication could provide an entry point
for a research agenda on the so-called “dark” side of
trust. Indeed, it is generally believed that trustworthiness becomes increasingly relevant to social conduct
in contexts with ambiguous elements (Belliveau et al.
1996, Chaiken 1980, Petty and Cacioppo 1996, Podolny
1993). Trusting behavior in such situations is likely to
reﬂect depersonalized presumptive rationales based on
lessons from prior history, information provided by third
parties, afﬁliation with speciﬁc social categories, formal roles, and organizational rules regarding transaction norms (Kramer 1999). In such situations, however,
miscalculation is possible and trust could be misplaced.
Though helpful in some circumstances, trust could be
dysfunctional in others. The characteristics of the knowledge, e.g., causal ambiguity, could provide discriminating factors between these two classes of circumstances,
deﬁning transitional thresholds between different types
of trust. The implications for practice seem clear. When
causal ambiguity is likely to be high, imputations of
trustworthiness (especially in terms of ability) should be
made with great care.
The difﬁculty is in making an appropriate valuation of
trustworthiness. Even with abundant information, trustworthiness at the unit level could be hard to establish.
This can be seen in the example of IBM Rochester, a
ﬂagship manufacturing plant at IBM, which produced
the AS/400 computer system. IBM’s Rochester plant

had the highest morale, lowest turnover and absenteeism
rates in IBM, won Minnesota’s Safety Award for 10 consecutive years, and IBM’s U.S. Market Driven Quality
Award for two consecutive years. Yet, it was not until
it won the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award,
a highly coveted designation conferred by the President
of the United States, that other units within IBM considered the Rochester plant to be a viable benchmark.
It took a very strong signal from a third party, indeed
the strongest possible signal at the time, to transform the
perception of trustworthiness (in terms of ability) and
therefore of the relevance of the fruits of Rochester’s
experiential learning for other organizational subunits.
In ambiguous situations, a third party, however sophisticated and savvy, may fall prey to the dark side of trust
by inferring that a source could properly signal the limits
of its trustworthiness. Such a third party may have the
organizational visibility and authority to certify sources
as trustworthy, even though these sources may be uncertain about the extent of their own ability, because of
causal ambiguity. Such circumstance is a vivid example
of how misplaced trust could foster superstitious learning (Levitt and March 1988).
The results of this study illustrate some elements
of the “true functioning” of trust in the context of
knowledge transfer, highlighting how causal ambiguity
moderates the role of perceived trustworthiness in the
process of transfer. Perceived trustworthiness has a more
nuanced and potentially intricate effect on the effectiveness of the transfer. Awareness of the level of irreducible
uncertainty may help prevent the accumulation of superstitious learning and thus increase the effectiveness of
the application of the lessons of experience in different contexts. We do hope that our study suggests how
knowledge transfer could serve as a useful context to
advance our understanding of the “true functioning” of
trust.
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Appendix 1. Identiﬁcation and Selection of the
Companies for the Sample
Two heuristics were used to identify ﬁrms that share best
practices internally. One heuristic was to seek large best-inclass ﬁrms that have small MES (Minimum Efﬁcient Scale).
These ﬁrms have many similar operating units that could
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readily beneﬁt from sharing best practices and thus have strong
incentives to replicate those best practices. The other heuristic
was to approach ﬁrms that are active in competitive benchmarking. An emerging norm in benchmarking is to benchmark inside the ﬁrm before attempting to benchmark outside
the ﬁrm, with internal benchmarking often leading to transfers
of identiﬁed internal best practices. Contact with benchmarking ﬁrms was sought through the International Benchmarking Clearinghouse of the American Productivity and Quality Center and through the Council on Benchmarking of the
Strategic Planning Institute (cf. Main 1992). After careful
scrutiny, this institution endorsed the survey and brought it
to the attention of its members. More than 2,000 copies of
a one-page description of the survey were mailed to the IBC
membership—around 200 companies at that time. Additional
ﬁrms with multiple small-scale operations were contacted individually. Besides relying on those two heuristics (small MES
and active in competitive benchmarking) some ﬁrms were contacted directly based on their earned reputation as pioneers in
the transfer of best practices inside the ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst step of the survey was devised as a feasibility test.
This test required companies to generate a list of transfers
to study and a list of parties involved in those transfers (i.e.,
of respondents). To pass the feasibility test, companies had
to submit a written statement of commitment to the project
signed by a senior executive. This executive was requested to
nominate a visible coordinator for the survey. The coordinator
would scrutinize the pilot questionnaire, coordinate the administration of the ﬁnal questionnaire, and act as a liaison with
the researcher regarding any other aspect of the project. The
ﬁrst task for the nominated coordinators was to provide a list,
and a succinct description, of the practices that their company
wished to study. They were also requested to provide a list
of actual transfers of those practices. For each transfer in that
list, coordinators were requested to identify a representative
of the source unit, a representative of the recipient unit, and a
representative of a third party.
To select “practices” for this study, the coordinators were
directed to search for transfers between peer units of important
activities or processes and to prefer those that showed evidence
of difﬁculty during the transfer. They were also instructed to
rule out practices that could be performed by a single individual and to exclusively favor those practices that required the
coordinated effort of several individuals.

Appendix 2. Operationalization of the Control Variables
• Each sentence in the description of the scales below is
the full text of the question as it appears in the questionnaire.
• Unless otherwise indicated, answers were scored using
the default scale (Y! y o n N!).
• The key for the default scale is Y! = “Yes!”; y = “yes,
but”; o = “no opinion”; n = “no, not really”; N! = “No!”.
• The overall score for each scale was computed by adding
the standardized scores obtained from each question.
Source Motivation ( = 093; items = 13) binary scales;
positive relationship to accuracy predicted
Source saw beneﬁt in: measuring its own performance; understanding its own practices; sharing this understanding with
other units; sharing the limits of this understanding with other
units; assessing the feasibility of the transfer; communicating
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with [recipient]; planning the transfer; documenting [practice]
for transfer; implementing [recipient’s] support systems; training [recipient’s] personnel; helping [recipient] troubleshoot;
helping resolve recipient’s unexpected problems; lending
skilled personnel.
Recipient Motivation ( = 093; items = 14) binary items;
positive relationship to accuracy predicted
Recipient saw beneﬁt in: measuring its own performance; comparing it with the performance of other units; understanding its
own practices; absorbing [source’s] understanding; analyzing
the feasibility of adopting [practice]; communicating its needs
to [source]; planning the transfer; implementing the systems
and facilities for [practice]; assigning personnel full time to
the transfer; assigning personnel to be trained in [practice];
understanding the implications of the transfer; troubleshooting
[practice]; insuring that its people knew their jobs; insuring
that its people consented to keep doing their jobs.
Recipient Absorptive Capacity ( = 083; items = 9) default
scale; positive relationship to accuracy predicted
Members of [recipient] have a common language to deal with
the [practice]; [recipient] had a vision of what it was trying
to achieve through the transfer; [recipient] had information on
the state of the art of the [practice]; [recipient] had a clear division of roles and responsibilities to implement the [practice];
[recipient] had the necessary skills to implement the [practice];
[recipient] had the technical competence to absorb the [practice]; [recipient] had the managerial competence to absorb the
[practice]; it is well known who can best exploit new information about the [practice] within [recipient]; it is well known
who can help solve problems associated with the [practice].
Recipient Retentive Ability ( = 081; items = 6) default
scale; negative relationship to accuracy predicted
[recipient] periodically retrains existing personnel on the
[practice]; [recipient] has mechanisms to detect malfunctions
of the [practice]; [recipient] regularly measures performance
and corrects problems as soon as they happen; [recipient’s]
personnel can predict how they will be rewarded for good performance in the [practice]; [recipient’s] personnel are provided
with numerous opportunities to commit freely and publicly to
perform their role; at [recipient] there is a clear focal point for
the [practice].
Proveness of Knowledge ( = 067; items = 3) default scale
unless indicated; positive relationship to accuracy predicted
We had solid proof that [practice] was really helpful; [practice]
contributes signiﬁcantly to the competitive advantage of
[company]; for the success of [company], the [practice] is:
1. critical, 2. very important, 3. fairly important,
4. fairly unimportant, or 5. not important at all.
Relationship Between Source and Recipient ( = 071;
items = 3) default scale; positive relationship to accuracy
predicted
Communication between [source] and [recipient] is 1. very
easy, 2. fairly easy, 3. fairly demanding, or 4. very
demanding; collaboration between [source] and [recipient]
1. is sought actively, 2. is well received, 3. preferably avoided, and 4. only if no other choice; collaboration between [source] and [recipient] (same scale as previous
question).
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Organizational Context ( = 077; items = 14) default scale;
positive relationship to accuracy predicted
Existing performance measures of the [practice] are detailed
enough to be meaningful; performance measures of the [practice] are taken frequently enough to be timely; performance
measures of the [practice] from different units are easily comparable; [company] enforces companywide standard policies
with respect to the [practice]; at [company] there is constant
pressure to improve performance; it is easy to justify time
spent visiting other units; to visit another unit, it is easy to
justify travel expenses; at [company] improving performance
by copying and adapting practices from other units is as legitimate as improving performance from own creativity; at [company] a unit that exposes those needs that it is unable to meet
on its own loses status (RS); at [company], a unit that exposes
unresolved problems loses status (RS); at [company], despite
structural differences, units can always learn from one another;
normally a best-in-class practice is most likely to be found
outside [company] (RS); at [company] managers seem to prefer to use external sources of help and support even though
they are more expensive and less useful (RS); at [company],
corporate pride and values encourage managers not to look
outside for help or to share with the outside (RS).

Endnotes

9

In total, 184 transfers of 44 practices were identiﬁed, requiring 445 questionnaires (in many cases it was not possible
to identify a third party to the transfer). Response rate was
calculated as 271/445. The coordinators from each company
provided a detailed account for each questionnaire sent, thus
providing an exhaustive nonresponse follow up. The most
common justiﬁcation for nonresponse was the lack of detailed
familiarity with the transfer. Other reasons for nonresponse
were “refused” or “left the company.”
10
Ability is deﬁned as “that group of skills, competencies, and
characteristics that enable a party to have inﬂuence within a
speciﬁc domain” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 717).
11
This distinction is similar to the one made by Henderson and
Clark (1990) between architectural knowledge and component
knowledge.
12
Such a band of 3.5 months can be considered narrow,
because it means that all transfers were sampled early on in
the integration stage that has been documented to last between
1.5 to 2 years.
13
P -value for the total effect is calculated using the
following t-statistic: tTrustworthiness tot = Trustworthiness
tot/SE( √Trustworthiness tot), where SE( Trustworthiness
tot) = VAR 2 + Causal Ambiguity2VAR( 1 × 2 +
2Causal Ambiguity COV( 2 1 × 2].

1

Mayer et al. (1995, p. 716) deﬁne trustworthiness in terms of
a trustee’s “expectations of how another person will behave,
based on that person’s current and previous implicit and
explicit claims.”
2
Allen and Stiff’s (1989) notion of “credibility” is equivalent
to the Mayer et al. (1995) construct of trustworthiness.
3
Consistent results are seen as the product of organizational
practices and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). Routines
consist of connected, recurrent behaviors coordinating the
actions of multiple individuals to produce a consistent output.
Knowledge transfer, in this sense, is the replication of routines
across geographical space.
4
A recipient (and source) is deﬁned as an organizational unit.
Following Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 98) the expression
“organizational unit” is thought of as any entity that can
“accomplish something on its own.” As they explain, organizational unit is used mostly to mean an individual, however, “it
is sometimes convenient to think of an organizational subunit
as a ‘member’ of the larger organization.” Trust, under this
speciﬁcation and particularly in intraorganizational transfers,
is conceived as an interunit, rather than interorganizational,
phenomenon.
5
This statement draws on Attewell’s (1992) notion of economizing on learning.
6
In particular, McAllister (1995) argues that a high level of
cognition-based trust, which is the trust derived from the evaluation of the positive characteristics of the other person, is
associated with little control-based monitoring, which is the
monitoring of the other person’s actions to control her or him.
7
Except in those situations where the source precisely signals
the limits of its advice.
8
The sample contained both technical and administrative
practices. Examples of technical practices are software development procedures and drawing standards. Examples of
administrative practices are upward appraisal and activitybased costing (ABC). Full disclosure of the practices studied
is precluded by a guarantee of conﬁdentiality.
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